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Maria Lugones's Work as a Human Rights
Idea(l)
Berta Esperanza Hernndez-Truyo1*
Mariana Ribeiro**
INTRODUCTION
This essay utilizes a human rights lens to examine Maria Lugones's work
and its praxical application. Maria Lugones, a Professor of philosophy and the
Director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Philosophy, Interpretation, and
Culture at the State University of New York at Binghamton, is a philosopher,
activist, and exciting educator. She is a preeminent figure in feminist philosophy.
Her life's work fights the oppression of outsiders by the dominant culture-be it of
minority cultures within the dominant culture or outliers within a minority culture.
She emphasizes this tension in multiple locations including ethnicity, race, gender,
and sexuality. She writes, grappling with the intersections of these geographies,
from numerous and shifting subject positions: she is Latina in the estados unidos; a
woman in a man's world; a lesbian in a straight world; an activist for equality in a
heteropatriarchal society. Lugones's work is about problems that exist and, most
significantly, about finding human solutions by forming coalitions where outsiders
work together to understand each other and with the majority to enlighten all about
the plights experienced by different lives.
Her foundation is about
multidimensionality, the coexistence of multiple oppressions, and how to liberate the
increasingly strangled soul. She is truly inspirational. Students often talk about how
she has changed their lives; how they see the world differently after being in her
courses and reading her works. The same is true for her readers, friends, and
family-she transforms us with her words and her work.
We develop the Lugones/human rights analysis in three parts. In Part I, we
present the human rights framework. This part briefly discusses key human rights
documents which include the Universal Declaration as well as treaties that elucidate
and enumerate the civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights-rights to
which persons are entitled simply because we are human beings. Human rights
treaties also include agreements that protect particular persons or groups--children,
women, racial minorities-as well as the environment. Following this introduction,
we address three aspects of the human rights paradigm that are most pertinent and

* Levin, Mabie & Levin Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law, Gainesville,
Florida. I wish to thank Mariana Ribeiro for her terrific presentation of and work on this essay. I also
thank Cindy Zimmerman for her editorial and word processing assistance. Of course, huge thanks are due
to Maria Lugones for her magnificent work.
** J.D. (University of Florida '06). 1wish to thank Professor Berta Hemndez-Truyol for her friendship,
support, and inspiration.
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directly related to this project: (1) the idea of the indivisibility of rights; (2) the right
to self-determination of peoples; and (3) equality/nondiscrimination principles.
Frequently, discussions about human rights are structured in terms of
hierarchical generations-the so-called first generation civil and political rights;
second generation social, economic, and cultural rights; and third generation
solidarity or group rights. Instead of such a segregation of rights approach, we
embrace the indivisibility and interdependence model that the human rights
documents embrace. Such a paradigm is the proper framework to pursue and
promote human thriving.
In Part II, we analyze Lugones's parallel ideas of (1)
hybridity/multidimensionality of "others;" (2) self-care/autonomy/agency of persons;
and (3) equality/hyphenation principles. We will show that these constructs
beautifully dovetail with the human rights framework. Part III presents a real
exercise that shows the utility of a Lugones-driven human rights analytical model in
attaining praxis. We conclude in Part IV that the reconstructed human rights
framework can effectively deploy the desired and shared Lugones aim of human
liberation.

I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
Modem international human rights law is a post-World War II
phenomenon. Its development can be attributed to the monstrous violations of
human rights committed during the Hitler era and to the belief that these horrendous
violations, and possibly the war itself, might have been prevented had an effective
international system for the protection of human rights existed in pre-war days.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt eloquently espoused the international human rights
cause as early as 1941. In his famous Four Freedoms speech,' President Roosevelt
called for "a world founded upon four essential human freedoms, 2 which he
identified as "freedom of speech and expression," "freedom of every person to3
worship God in his own way," "freedom from want," and "freedom from fear.",
President Roosevelt's version of "the moral order"'4 as he characterized it, became
the clarion call of nations that fought the axis powers in World War II and
constituted the foundational ideas for the United Nations. 5
After the 1948 embrace of the non-binding Universal Declaration on
Human Rights 6 ("Universal Declaration"), many in the international community
hoped to adopt the ideas presented in that ground-breaking document in a single
covenant. This document would afford protection for a range of rights-not only the
civil and political but also the social, economic, and cultural rights-included in the
Universal Declaration. But after almost two decades of debate, States adopted two

I. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, The Four Freedoms, Address before 77th U.S.
Congress, Jan. 6, 1941, available at http://www.libertynet.org/edcivic/fdr.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and Institutions:
Accomplishments and Prospects, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1988).
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 217 (111.1948), adopted Dec. 10,
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separate covenants-separating out protection of "first" and "second" generation
rights: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 7 ("ICCPR") and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' ("ICESCR").
The historical context that resulted in these two separate treaties elucidates
and underscores the perceived hierarchies of values that give primacy to civil and
political rights over economic, social, and cultural rights. In fact, it was the then
second world (the Communist countries) and the third world (the newly independent
African and Latin American countries, at last free from colonialism) that
championed and demanded economic rights. 9 These rights, classified as positive
rights, require governmental intervention for the betterment of the population. The
"developed" nations, on the other hand, wanted to emphasize the civil and political
rights in the Western individualistic tradition. These are "negative" rights as they
create a geography free from governmental interference rather than requiring any
proactive action from the government.
Thus, although the United Nations General Assembly adopted both the
ICCPR and the ICESCR, the international community, based on the bifurcation,
perceived a hierarchy of rights that gave preeminence to the negative civil and
political individual rights. Indeed the priority that has evolved between the two
groups of rights, even contrary to the indivisibility preambular language of the
Universal Declaration, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR, 0 becomes apparent by the
nature of the obligations undertaken by States. By ratifying the ICESCR, a State
Party does not assume the obligation of immediate implementation found in the
ICCPR. Rather, as the language of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR indicates, by
ratifying the Economic Covenant a State undertakes the obligation merely to take
steps "to the maximum of its available resources" in order to achieve "progressively
the full realization" of those rights. 1
Unlike the ICESCR, which calls for
progressive implementation tied to available resources, 12 the ICCPR imposes an
immediate obligation "to respect and ensure"' 13 the rights it proclaims and to take
whatever other measures are necessary to bring about that result.
Although many claim the universality of origin and applicability of civil
and political rights, the development of these rights has been nationalized,

7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR].
8. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966), 993
U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 [hereinafter ICESCR].
9. Berta E. Hemindez-Truyol, Human Rights Through a Gendered Lens: Emergence,
Evolution, Revolution, I WOMEN & INT'L HUM. RTs. L. 3 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds.,
1999) [hereinafter Hemrindez-Truyol, Gendered Lens].
10. ICCPR, supra note 7, at pmbl ("Recognizing ...the ideal of free human beings enjoying
civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created
whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural
rights."); ICESCR, supra note 8, at pmbl. ("Recognizing ... the ideal of free human beings enjoying
freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy
his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights."). See also Universal
Declaration, supranote 6.
11.ICESCR, supra note 8, at art. 2(1). But see HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 237-63 (2d ed. 2000) (suggesting
that the difference in language does not create a lesser obligation).
12. ICESCR, supra note 8.
13. ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 2(1).
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politicized, and gendered. 14 The notion of human rights that emerged, rather than
being truly universal, was rather normative, cast in the mold of the "white, Anglo,
Western, European, Judeo-Christian, educated, propertied, heterosexual, able-bodied
male norm."'15 Such rights are regarded as merely "formal freedoms" or "paper
freedoms" that neglect and even turn a blind eye to the realities of today's social
conditions-conditions that adherence to the rights contained in the ICESCR would
go a long way to alleviate.
As a practical matter, however, the bifurcation of the Universal Declaration
into two separate, unequally valued treaties symbolizes the idea that people's
identities and lives can be easily divisible and atomized. 16 This bifurcation suggests
that our political citizenship can be neatly separated from our cultural, economic, and
social selves. Many view this flawed severability concept as a tool of domination
and oppression. 17 In sum, the shift from a unitary view of rights to the split in the
covenants can be viewed as an exercise of power by the "developed" nations over
the "under-developed" nations.
Moreover, before engaging the relevant documents and specific rights, it is
important to acknowledge that the human rights system suffers from some
weaknesses, reflected in critiques that it is hierarchical, gendered, racialized, and
imperialistic. Whereas the human rights discipline has Western liberal origins that
are particularized as well as relativistic and can be viewed as imperialistic or
colonial, it can be reconceptualized to have a pluralistic and universal foundation.
Maria Lugones would admonish, correctly, that such reconceptualization should be
done in light of plural concerns not just another single axis analysis. 18 However, our
analysis embraces the utilization of a reconstructed pluralistic human rights
framework that incorporates the feminist critique that the human rights agenda as
crafted fails to consider the condition and needs of women, the Asian critique that
challenges the framework as Western, the third world critique that underscores the
system as Northern and industrialized, and the anti-colonialist critique that notes the
structure was crafted during colonial days and has not accommodated changes. This
formulation promotes personhood and is counter-hegemonic.' 9

14. Hemfndez-Truyol, Gendered Lens, supra note 9, at 5.
15. Id.
16. AUDRE LoRDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984) (on atomization of identity).
17. Berta E. Hemndez-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered: Normativities, Latinas, and a LatCrit
Paradigm,72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882 (1997) [hereinafter Hemrnndez-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered].
18. See, e.g., Maria Lugones & Joshua Price, The Inseparabilityof Race, Class, and Gender in
Latino Studies, I LATINO STUD. 329, 331 (2003) [hereinafter Lugones & Price, The Inseparability]
(noting that "[t]his re-conception should not go back to an analysis that centers class as more fundamental
and separable from the issues of gender, race or sexuality").
19. See, e.g., Hemindez-Truyol, Gendered Lens, supra note 9; Berta E. HemAndez-Truyol &
Sharon E. Rush, Foreward: Culture, Nationhood,and the Human Rights Ideal, 33 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
233 (2000); Berta E. Hemfndez-Truyol, Building Bridges IV: Of Cultures, Colors, and ClashesCapturing the International in Delgado's Chronicles, 4 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 115 (2001). See also
HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
FEMINIST ANALYSIS (2000) (feminist critique); W. THEODORE DEBARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN

RIGHTS (1998) (Asian critique); Makau Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African CulturalFingerprint:
An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339 (1995) (Africanist critique); Makau
Mutua,
A
Third
World
Critique
of
Human
Rights,
http://www.ceu.hu/legal/universalism%20and%201ocal%20knowledge%2Oin%20HR%202003/Makaute
xt.htm (last visited June 22, 2008) (third world critique); R. Panikkar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a
Western Concept?, 30(120) DIOGENES 75 (1982) (Eastem critique).
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There are several categories of international agreements that present the
ideas of indivisibility of rights, self-determination of peoples, and equality of
persons. One class of agreement addresses general rights. Two such significant
agreements are the ICCPR20 and the ICESCR.2 1 These covenants define a broad
range of rights in their respective civil and political and social, economic, and
cultural categories. Both covenants contain a few common substantive provisions,
all of which are pertinent to the focus of this essay: (1) similar preambular language
on the indivisibility of rights; 22 (2) a common Article 1(1) 23 providing for the right
of self-determination; 2 and (3) a common Article 225 articulating
equality/nondiscrimination clauses.26
The second type of treaties that illuminate Lugones's work as human rights
centered are regional agreements. For example, the American Convention on
Human Rights 27 ("American Convention"), the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,28 and the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights2 9 ("African Charter") provide regional human rights
protections. Because of their geographic focus, these instruments can engage the
idea of local culture.
Interestingly, Latin America and Africa, the two regions (other than the
Communist states) that originally opposed the bifurcation of the rights included in
the Universal Declaration advocated by "developed" nations, have created their own
convention-based system that integrates civil and political rights and economic,
social, and cultural rights. This approach embraces the indivisibility ideal and
accepts that all classes of rights are equally important for human well-being.

20. ICCPR, supra note 7.
21. ICESCR, supranote 8.
22. Provisions for indivisibility of rights are included in other human rights documents.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, U.N.G.A. Res. 280, 19
l.L.M. 33 (1980), adopted by the U.N.G.A. on Dec. 18, 1979, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981 [hereinafter
CEDAW], pmbl. & art. 3; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 5 I.L.M.
352 (1966), entered into force Jan. 4, 1969 [hereinafter CERD], arts. 2 & 5; American Convention on
Human Rights, 9 L.L.M. 673 (1970), entered into force July 18, 1978 [hereinafter American Convention],
art. 16; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 21 I.L.M. 59 (1981), adopted June 27, 1981,
entered intoforce Oct. 21, 1986 [hereinafter African Charter], pmbl. & art. 22.
23. ICCPR, supranote 7, at art. 1(1); ICESCR, supra note 8, at art. 1(I).
24. Provisions for self-determination are included in other human rights documents.
CEDAW, supra note 22, arts. 7, 9, 10; CERD, supra note 22, pmbl., art. 5; American Convention, supra
note 22, art. 23; African Charter, supra note 22, pmbl., art. 20.
25. ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 2(1) ("Each State Party ... undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction ... without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status."); ICESCR, supra note 8, at art. 2(2) ("The State Parties ... undertake to
guarantee that the rights ... will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.").
26. Provisions for equality/nondiscrimination are included in other human rights documents.
CEDAW, supra note 22, at pmbl., arts. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7-16; CERD, supra note 22, at pmbl., arts. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7;
American Convention, supra note 22, at arts. 1, 8, 17, 24, 27; African Charter, supra note 22, pmbl., arts.
2,18-20,28.
27. American Convention, supra note 22.
28. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
312 U.N.T.S. 221, signed Nov. 4, 1950, entered intoforce Sept. 3, 1953.
29. African Charter, supra note 22.
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The American Convention 30 rejects the idea of hierarchical rights. It
recognizes that persons possess multidimensional complex identities that cannot be
atomized and still retain the essence of a human being. Although the American
Convention guarantees some two-dozen broad categories of civil and political rights,
the Convention also contains an undertaking by State Parties to take progressive
measures for "the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social,
educational, scientific, and cultural standards." 31 Unlike the obligations of a State
Party under the ICESCR, where the State obligates itself merely to take steps "to the
maximum of its available resources" in order to achieve "progressively the full
realization" of these rights,32 the American Convention uses stronger language and
requires a State Party to adopt whatever measures may be necessary and reasonable
under the circumstances to ensure their full enjoyment.33 Although the American
Convention allows State Parties to derogate from their obligations "[i]n time of war,
public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security, 3 4
unlike the ICCPR, the American Convention also declares that "the judicial
guarantees essential for the protection" of the non-derogable rights may not be
35
The catalog of non-derogable rights is also longer than that of the
suspended.
36
ICCPR.
Even within the list of non-derogable rights found in Article 4 of the
ICCPR, there exists a possible hierarchy. The list of non-derogable rights found
under Article 4 of the ICCPR is uncontroversial; it includes rights that have reached
a consensus within the international community as being central to an individual's
human existence. The ICCPR's list of rights that are derogable in times of "public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation ' 37 are rights that have implications
on State sovereignty and executive privilege. Thus, it creates a hierarchy in which
internationally recognized rights take prominence over rights with respect to the
enforcement of which State Parties have discretion in order to protect the welfare of
the state and national security. These provisions that allow State Parties to derogate
from their obligations in times of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation are partially balanced by Article 5(1), which prohibits the imposition of
restrictions or limitations aimed at the destruction of the rights or "their limitation to
a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant." s In practice,
particularly in States that lack a strong and independent judiciary, the provisions that

30. American Convention, supra note 22.
31. Id. at art. 26.
32. ICESCR, supra note 8.
33. American Convention, supra note 22, at art. 2.
34. Id. at art. 27(1).
35. Id. at art. 27(2) (specifically noting as non-derogable the rights to judicial personality, life,
and humane treatment; freedom from slavery, ex post facto laws, conscience and religion; rights of the
family, to a name, of the child, to nationality, to participate in government, "or of the judicial guarantees
essential for the protection of such rights").
36. Compare id. with ICCPR, supranote 7, at art. 4(2) (noting as non-derogable the inherent
right to life, art. 6; the right to be free from torture, art. 7; the right to not be held in slavery, art. 8; the
right not to be imprisoned merely on the inability to fulfill a contractual obligation, art. 11; the right not to
be held guilty of a criminal offense that under national or international law does not constitute a crime, art.
15; the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law, art. 16; and finally the right to freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion, art. 18).
37. ICCPR, supranote 7, at art. 4(l).
38. Id. at art. 5().
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permit derogations provide justification for non-compliance by governments that are
prone to violate existing human rights obligations.
The African Charter, sometimes referred to as the "Banjul Charter," 39 like
the American Convention, rejects the division between political rights and social
rights that the "developed" nations of the North and the West advocate. The African
Charter differs from the ICCPR and the ICESCR in a number of respects. First, the
African Charter proclaims not only rights but also duties of both the State Parties and
of individuals. 40 Second, it codifies peoples' group or solidarity rights-such as the
right to development1-as well as individual rights.42 Third, and significant to this
discussion, the African Charter, beyond protecting solidarity rights and guaranteeing
civil and political rights, also protects economic, social, and cultural rights.43
Another noteworthy aspect of the African Charter is the emphasis that it
places on African tradition expressed in its preamble as well as in the articulation of
myriad rights and duties. 4 The preamble speaks of "the virtues of [African]
historical tradition and the values of African civilization which should inspire and
characterize their reflection on the concept of human and people's rights. 45 The
preamble also refers to the principle of indivisibility of social and solidarity rights
that inform and are prevalent in the African Charter:
Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay a particular
attention to the right to development and that civil and political
rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural
rights in their conception as well as universality and that the
satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee

39. African Charter, supra note 22.
40. Id. at arts. 24-29.
41. Id. at pmbl., arts. 20(1), 22(1), 24.
42. Id. at ch. I ("Human and Peoples' Rights"). In Africa, there exists a fundamental concept
ofubuntu and this concept is very difficult to render into a Western language. Ubuntu speaks of the very
essence of being human. "When you have ubuntu you share what you have." It is to say "My humanity is
caught up, is inextricably bound up in yours, we belong in a bundle of life." In Africa we say, "A person
is a person through other persons." It is not, "I think therefore I am." It says rather: "I am a human being
because I belong. I Participate, I share." DESMOND TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 31
(1999). The African Charter seems to address only individual rights in its first part, beginning in Article
2, which states that every individual is entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms under the
Charter without discrimination, and ending in Article 17, which states that every individual has the right to
an education, to take part freely in the cultural life of his community and to the promotion and protection
of morals and traditions recognized by the community. The remainder of the rights section of the African
Charter is exclusively dedicated to the people's group or solidarity rights, with all the subjects of the
articles being "the family" and "all peoples." African Charter, supra note 22.
43. See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 22, at arts. 14 (property), 15 (work), 16 (health).
44. Rights that reflect the emphasis that is placed on African tradition in the African Charter
are delineated in Art. 17(2) ("Every individual may freely, take part in the cultural life of his
community."); Art. 17(3) ("The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by
the community shall be the duty of the state."); Art. 21(4) ("State parties to the present Charter shall
individually and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a
view to strengthening African unity and solidarity."). Id. Duties that reflect the emphasis that is placed on
African tradition in the African Charter are delineated in Art. 29(7) ("To preserve and strengthen positive
African cultural values in his relations with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance,
dialogue and consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral well being of
society."); Art. 29(8) ("To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the
promotion and achievement of African unity."). Id.
45. Id. at pmbl.
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for the enjoyment of civil and political rights.46
The obligations assumed by the State Parties to the African Charter are
strikingly different than those obligations found under the previously discussed
covenants. For example, the African Charter places greater emphasis on negotiation
and conciliation. According to African conception of law, disputes are not settled by
contentious procedures, but through reconciliation47 , which generally takes place
through discussions that end in a consensus. The result of this process is that there
are neither winners nor losers.
Article 1 of the African Charter spells out the basic obligation of the State
Parties to the Charter, providing that they "shall recognize the rights, duties and
freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other
measures to give effect to them., 48 Article 62 complements this obligation by
requiring the State Parties to report biennially "on the legislative or other measures"
they have adopted to give effect to the fights recognized and guaranteed by the
Charter.49
The African Charter establishes two other important obligations on State
Parties. Article 25 imposes a "duty" on the State Parties "to promote and ensure
through teaching, education and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms
[the Charter guarantees] and to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as
corresponding obligations and duties are understood."5 °
This provision, if
imaginatively and creatively constructed, could prove helpful to non-governmental
human rights organizations in developing a useful program of human rights
education in Africa. Article 26, in addition to declaring that the State Parties have a
duty to "guarantee the independence of the Courts," provides that the Parties "shall
allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions
entrusted with the promotion and protection" of the rights set forth in the Charter.'
Although it is not clear whether the phrase "national institutions" refers to
governmental as well as non-governmental institutions, both types of bodies could
play an important role in legitimating the human rights debate in individual African
countries.
Thus, the American Convention and the African Charter, by adopting the
indivisibility and interdependence paradigm, recognize the complexity of needs that
must be met in order to enable human thriving. Such a realistic and pragmatic
approach, much like Lugones's work, debunks the persistent idea that civil and
political rights are of greater value than economic, social, and cultural rights.
Moreover, this paradigmatic move effectively challenges the flawed scheme that
suggests that human personalities and identities are divisible into discrete, unrelated
parts.
The third type of human rights agreements pertinent to an analysis of
Lugones's work is the international agreements that focus on specific populations.
In this regard, two particular conventions are pertinent in analyzing Lugones's work:

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
See, e.g.,
Id. at art.
Id. at art.
Id. at art.
Id.
at art.

id. at art. 48.
I.
62.
25.
26.
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2
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women5
("CEDAW"), which addresses the condition of women, and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Race Discrimination 53 ("CERD"), which addresses
matters of race. Both are important rights documents vis-A-vis Lugones's work
because they address two foundations-sex and race--of her analysis of
subordination.
In 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted the CERD, which has been
described as "the most comprehensive and unambiguous codification in treaty form
of the equality of races. 54 CERD proscribes racial discrimination, defined in the
treaty as:

[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin [having] the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or
any other field of public life.55
Interestingly, this definition establishes a racialization-of-differences
paradigm that comports with the estado unidense predominant view of race. Such a
view collapses national and ethnic identities into racial identity. By such a rhetorical
move, the definition transmogrifies national and ethnic identity into racial categories.
Thus, CERD created a very particularized, inadequate, and distorted concept that
erases the significant-and different-identity categories of color, ethnicity, descent,
and nationality.
Similar to CERD's goal of ending racial discrimination, CEDAW seeks to
eradicate sex-based discrimination. In 1979, the United Nation General Assembly
adopted CEDAW in an effort to recognize and remedy women's disparate and
subordinated position world-wide. CEDAW seeks to do away with discrimination
against women that impairs the enjoyment by women of "human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other
Quite significantly, CEDAW expressly recognizes that women's
field." 56
subordination often is grounded on gendered cultural tropes. Consequently, it
requires State Parties to change existing laws and to adopt new norms to ensure
women's equality.
The structural bases for existing and persisting gendered power imbalances
can be explained, in part, by the traditional emphasis on civil and political rights over
social and cultural rights. The inclusion in CEDAW of civil and political rights as
well as social, economic, and cultural rights acknowledges that both sets of rights are
of critical importance to women's full personhood. CEDAW thus embraces
women's right to equality in the realistic context of the complex, multidimensional
beings they are.

52. CEDAW, supra note 22. The United States has not ratified this convention.
53. CERD, supra note 22. The United States has not ratified the convention.
54. Egan Schwelb, The InternationalConvention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
15 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 996, 1057 (1966).
55. CERD, supra note 22, at art. 1(1).
56. CEDAW, supra note 22, at art. 1.
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Regrettably, the effectiveness of CEDAW in promoting the protection of
57
the rights it guarantees has been severely undermined by the many reservations
made by State Parties in ratifying this treaty. In fact, CEDAW is the most reservedagainst treaty in history. 5 Thus, even as State Parties purportedly commit to
promote women's equality and full personhood, the dominant (here patriarchal)
culture influences and undercuts that promise by the use of reservations. Most of
these reservations seek to preserve various national or religious institutions that are
in conflict with CEDAW's basic premises of equality. 59 It is noteworthy that the
United States has signed but has not ratified CEDAW.
Hugely interesting (and flawed), particularly in light of the indivisibility
paradigm of the ICCPR and ICESCR and of Lugones's emphasis on women of color,
is the reality that CEDAW is silent on race and CERD is silent on sex.
Unfortunately, particularly in a context that appears to integrate the indivisibility
paradigm, one of CEDAW's weaknesses is that it does not integrate race into its
gender-centered construct, a vacuum that parallels the failure of CERD 60 to integrate
gender into its race-centered construct.
To be sure, where cultural practices are concerned, it is important, on the
one hand, to protect traditions from the improper imposition of outsiders'
imperialistic and patriarchal ideologies. On the other hand, however, culture should
not be utilized as a pretext to shield norms that perpetuate women's or racial
minorities' subordination.
Notwithstanding the weaknesses and omissions shared by the ICCPR and
ICESCR, as well as CERD and CEDAW, these documents can be positively used to
provide context to a project of liberation. By deploying the reconstructive idea that
is necessary to develop a non-hegemonic human rights construct, CERD's and
CEDAW's flaws can be transmogrified to contribute to full human well-being. For
example, CERD's conflation of race with color, ethnicity, descent, and nationality

57. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969),
entered into force Jan. 27, 1990 (defining reservation as "a unilateral statement, however phrased or
named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it
purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to
that State"). Id. at art. 2(l)(d). The United States has not ratified this convention, but accepts it as
customary law.
58. See U.N. Division of the Advancement of Women, Reservations to CEDAW, availableat
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/cedaw/reservations.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006); see also Julie A.
Minor, An Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
DiscriminationAgainst Women, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 144 (1994).
59. Many states, however, enter reservations to certain articles on the grounds that national
law, tradition, religion, or culture are not congruent with Convention principles. For example, the
government of Bangladesh does not consider itself bound by the provisions of Arts. 2 and 16(1)(c)
because they conflict with Shari'a law based on the Holy Quran and Sunna. The Kuwaiti government also
does not consider itself bound by Art. 16(f) because it conflicts with the provisions of the Islamic Shari'a.
Some states draw their reservations so widely that the effect cannot be limited to specific provisions of the
Convention. For example, Saudi Arabia adopted CEDAW with the reservation that the country will not
observe any terms of the Treaty that conflict with the norms of Islamic law. Thus, a predicament develops
between the state's domestic laws and CEDAW's provisions. In this context, reservations allow for the
ratification of CEDAW only to the extent that the Treaty's provisions correlate to existing domestic law in
a particular state. CEDAW allows states to commit to women's equality, while simultaneously admitting
that those particular states do not intend to grant equality to women. UN Treaty Collection, CEDAW,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partU/chapterIV/treatyl 0.asp (last
visited Feb. 27, 2006) (listing all declarations and reservations made by State Parties to CEDAW).
60. See supra notes 54-55 & accompanying text (discussing CERD).
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can be utilized to establish global acceptance of the indivisibility of multiple identity
components rather than to suggest erasure of differences between/among those
categories. As Maria Lugones has so poignantly observed, "I realize that separation
into clean, tidy things and beings is not possible for me because it would
61 be the death
of myself as multiplicitous and a death of community with my own."

II. THE WORK OF MARIA LUGONES
The work of Maria Lugones can be utilized to focus on the same ideas of
human reality articulated in the human rights framework. She engages the
complexity of humans-the indivisibility of their identity components-through her
concepts of hybridity/multidimensionality. 62 Similarly, Lugones captures the human
need for self-determination-a right embedded in the human rights framework-in
her work on autonomy, agency, and self-care. 63 Finally, her quest for an antisubordination ideal, like the human rights mandate for equality and
nondiscrimination, comes to life in her call for the recognition of 64and respect for the
equality of cultures and her observations on hyphenated identities.
The ideology that human personalities can be atomized into clean, pure
parts-like the original reading of the definition of race discrimination in the CERD
suggests and as the indivisibility construct of the ICCPR and ICESCR reject-is
anathema to the reality of human existence. This flawed view of personhood as
severable is reflected in the Western idea that civil and political rights are of greater
value than economic, social, and cultural rights. In her work, Lugones views this
required fragmentation, forced on people by "developed societies," as a form of
oppression much like non-Western peoples-peoples from the South and the East61. Maria Lugones, Purity,Impurity, and Separation, 19 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN INCULTURE &
SoC. 458, 469 (1994) [hereinafter Lugones, Purity].
62. See Maria C. Lugones, On Borderlands/LaFrontera:An Interpretive Essay, 7 HYPATIA
31 (1992) [hereinafter Lugones, On Borderlands];Maria Lugones, Hablando Cara a CaralSpeakingFace
to Face: An Exploration of Ethnocentric Racism, in MAKING FACE, MAKING SOULIHACIENDO CARAS:
CREATIVE AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES BY FEMINIST OF COLOR 46 (Gloria Anzaldcia ed., 1990)
[hereinafter Lugones, Hablando]; Lugones, Purity, supranote 61; Lugones, The Inseparability,supra note
18; Maria C. Lugones, Playfulness, 'World'-Travelling, and Loving Perception,2 HYPATIA 3 (1987).
63. See Maria Lugones, Hard-to-HandleAnger, in OVERCOMING RACISM AND SEXISM 203
(Linda A. Bell & David Blumenfeld eds., 1995); Maria Lugones & Joshua Price, Problems of Translation
in Postcolonial Thinking, ANTHROPOLOGY NEWS 42, Apr. 2003; Lugones, Hablando, supra note 62;
Maria C. Lugones, Tenuous Connections in Impure Communities, 4 ETHICS & THE ENV'T 85 (1999);
Maria Lugones & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Competition, Compassion and Community: Models for Feminist
Ethos, in COMPETITION: A FEMINIST TABOO? 234 (Valerie Miner & Helen E. Longino eds., 1982); Maria
Lugones, On the Logic of Pluralist Feminism, in FEMINIST ETHICS 35 (Claudia Card ed., 1991)
[hereinafter Lugones, On the Logic]; Lugones, Purity, supra note 61; Maria Lugones & Joshua Price,
Dominant Culture: El Deseo por un Alma Pobre (The Desire for an Impoverished Soul), in
MULTICULTURALISM FROM THE MARGINS: NON-DOMINANT VOICES ON DIFFERENCE AND DIVERSITY 103
(Dean A. Harris ed., 1995) [hereinafter Lugones & Price, Dominant Culture]; Maria Lugones & Joshua
Price, Encuentros and Desencuentros: Reflections on a LatCrit Colloquium in Latin America, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 743 (2004) [hereinafter Lugones & Price, Encuentros].
64. See Maria Lugones & Pat A. Rosezelle, Sisterhoodand Friendship as Feminist Models, in
FEMINISM AND COMMUNITY 134 (Penny A. Weiss & Marilyn Friedman eds., 1995); Lugones, On
Borderlands,supra note 62; Maria Lugones, Motion, Stasis, and Resistance to Interlocked Oppressions,
in MAKING WORLDS: GENDER, METAPHOR, MATERIALITY 49 (Susan H. Aiken et al. eds., 1998); Lugones,
Hablando,supra note 62; Lugones, On the Logic, supra note 63; Lugones, Purity, supra note 61; Lugones
& Price, Dominant Culture, supra note 63; Lugones & Price, Encuentros, supra note 63; Lugones &
Price, The Inseparability,supra note 18.
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view the separation of civil and political from social, economic, and cultural rights.
For example, Lugones finds that the "other"-the dual, hyphenated
personality-is an Angla/o creation, which subordinates the "other" aspect of the
self. The "other" is not-and cannot be-a hybrid cultural self because hybridity
would require equal recognition and respect for all identity components. According
to Lugones, it is part of the Angla/o imagination (and reflective of its dominant
posture) that "outsiders" keep "their" culture and assimilate-a colonialist position
that is intrinsically contradictory if both cultures were equally respected and
understood as informing the "real" fabric of everyday life. Lugones explains that the
Angla/o imagines each Mexicana/Americana as having a dual personality: the
"authentic" Mexicana cultural self and the "American" self. In using the
Mexicana/Americana example, Lugones writes that the Angla/o imagination
construes "Mexicana" as the essential nature of an exploitable being who is a
practitioner of futile and ornamental culture.
[T]he success of the White Man's control of the world is
debatable; but his success in making other people act just like him
is not. No culture that has come in contact with Western industrial
culture has been unchanged by it, and most have been assimilated
or annihilated, surviving
only as vestigial variations in dress,
65
cooking or ethics.
Thus, the "authentic" Mexicana craft shops exhibit "santos, trasteros,
colchas, reredos."66 Being "American" is what supposedly gives "others"
membership in the "real" culture. Being "American" is what transmogrifies others
into functioning citizens, albeit functioning citizens of a second class, because of the
non-normative identity component. Thus, if the American part of an outsider's
hyphenated being is what makes others "real citizens," then the Mexicana part is
purely superficial and, thus, worthless in the eyes of the dominant American society.
Therefore, as central to the understanding of cultural domination and oppression, we
must draw the contrast between structural, here American, and ornamental, here
Mexican, cultures.
Lugones explains that a culture is considered dominant when it significantly
or exclusively informs the institutional structure and values of the society, and when
the processes through which it came to inform itself involve the reduction of other
cultures to ornaments. 67 These ornamental, non-dominant cultures, however, are
necessary for the perpetuation of the dominant culture in two major ways. One, they
lend the dominant culture a sense of its own importance and originality. Two, at the
same time as the ornamental cultures are judged to be inferior, their presence is
socially valuable because they underscore the requirement to use a certain set of
values and norms in order to be understood as a full subject. In this regard, other
cultures' internalization of Angla/o ideals of progress and competency intensifies
and reinforces the dominant structure and its mandates and, in so doing, renders the

65. Urlsula K. Le Guin, Feeling the Hot Breath of Civilization, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1989
(reviewing MARIO V. LLOSA, THE STORYTELLER) (Helen Lane trans., 1989), available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE3D6103FF93AA15753CI A96F948260.
66. Lugones, Purity, supra note 61, at 471. Authors' translation: saints, old furniture, quilts,
retables.
67. Lugones, On Borderlands, supra note 62, at 35.
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"other" exploitable. In this regard, the outsider still will not be able to achieve full
participation in Angla/o life because as a colonized subject s/he is unable to define
her/himself. Rather, the dominant structure defines the outsider and, in the process,
subordinates her/him.
The atomization of a personality is part of the mythical portrait of colonized
peoples. The split renders the self unable to be culturally creative in a moving
culture.
This inability to be "culturally creative" makes people, mestizos,
chicanos, not quite at ease in one's own cultural skin, precisely
because it is not one's own but a stereotype and because this
authentic culture is not quite an alive culture: it is conceived by the
Anglo as both fixed and dying.
As american, one moves; as mexican one is static. As american,
one is beyond culture; as mexican, one is culturally personified.
The culturally split self is a character for the theatrics of racism. 68
Throughout her writings, Lugones correctly depicts and makes known to
her readers the paradox of cultural domination, which works against both selfdetermination and equality. "The term culture is used within the Anglo culture to
mark differences from its own conceptions of people and things., 69 Thus, Lugones,
as well as Joshua Price, observe that Anglas/os "act" whereas non-Anglas/os
"practice" their culture. This perspective allows the dominant culture to conceive of
non-normative corporal subjects and their culture as fixed and ritualistic rather than
creative. "Anglo culture conceives of itself as expressive of what is universal, and so
beyond culture in a narrow, provincial sense: it is postcultural, it is not a culture at
all."70 In this way, it is the "truth;" it is the dominant and ruling voice, the one that
defines the self, i.e., the only one free to engage in self-determination and to decide
equality. Dominant culture thus sets itself up as the norm to which all must conform
in order to be equal. In so doing, it both embraces indivisibility by particularizing in
the norm those combined traits of the dominant force in terms of race, gender,
language, sexuality, socio-economics, and religion and turns it on its head by
pathologizing and rendering inferior and subordinate any deviation from the
dominant traits.

III.

LUGONES'S WORK AS A HUMAN RIGHTS PRAXIS

We are the interdependent intersections of our race, gender, color,
ethnicity, nationality,ancestry, culture and language.7'
The theory that the Angla/o culture envisions itself as "post-cultural" and
beyond culture was played out exactly as Lugones predicted throughout her writings
in a small, in-class exercise performed by Professor Berta Hemndez-Truyol during
a class on culture in a human rights course. The challenge was outwardly simple.

68.
69.
70.
71.

Lugones, Purity, supranote 61, at 471.
Lugones & Price, Dominant Culture,supranote 63, at 105.
Id.
Hem6ndez-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered,supra note 17, at 883.
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First, she asked the students to self identify, i.e., to answer the question "Who am I?"
Second, she asked students to be anthropological observers and describe who she
was.
What turned out to be the most interesting part of the experiment emerged
the next day when Professor Hernndez-Truyol shared with the class the results of
the project. The first and more interesting result is that only "others" described
themselves in racial or ethnic terms. This outcome is a performance of the
adornment paradigm Lugones articulates. It is the non-normative cultural trappings
that define the self. The class was diverse, with many non-Angla/o students being
indistinguishable in dress, education, accent, and language from their Angla/o
counterparts. Yet, they remain self-identified as ethnic/racial "others."
The results of this exercise show that the course traveled towards becoming
an "other" is necessarily culturally relative,72 sometimes individualized, and always
complex. It becomes obvious as reflected by the students' answers that the "othering
path" depends on one's original location. The journey to end performance of self
will differ between persons; it depends on whether one is born into or finds oneself
as a designated minority within a minority or the majority culture or if one is born
into the majority culture.
This simple and yet quite telling exercise demonstrates two very explicit
outcomes. First, atomization of identity simply makes no sense to minorities whose
multiple identities are interdependent and indivisible parts of the whole. Thus, the
multidimensionality of both foreigners and minorities in the United States is in
tension with the dominant legal paradigms that take a single-attribute, analytical
approach to identity. Second, persons' life experiences inform their perspective in
an outcome determinative manner. Individual perspectives of who we think we are
as individuals are inextricably intertwined with experiences-personal, social,
cultural, educational-and beliefs-religious, civil, political-that influence both
perspective and analysis.
The second interesting result of the project was that the students were much
more descriptive of who they perceived Professor Hernndez-Truyol to be than who
they perceived themselves to be. Indeed, while most students defined her in ethnic
and gender terms, there were two categories used to define Professor HernndezTruyol that were not at all utilized by the students when self-identifying: sexuality
and weight. Lugones's philosophical writings explain this outcome: our ethnicities
and races are key markings of the power structure. Thus, for example, "White/Anglo
women can see themselves only as simply human or as simply women. 7 3 The result
of the class exercise confirms this. Majority men and women see themselves,
uncomplicatedly, as human or as men or women. There is a silence on any
markings. It is precisely because of this silence and this lack of desire to mark
majoritarian traits while continuing to mark others that the unmarked group is
dominant and the marked subordinated.

72. On cultural relativism, see Berta Esperanza Hemhndez-Truyol, To Bear or Not to Bear:
Reproductive Freedom as an International Human Right, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309, n.53-54 &
accompanying text (1991).
73. Lugones, Hablando,supra note 62, at 49-50.
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CONCLUSION

Si No Miras, Vata, Nunca Veras Nada. 4
This lack of recognition of "self' traits, their erasure except in "others," "is
a radical form of passivity toward the ideology of the ethnocentric racist state that
privileges the dominant culture as the only culture to see with and conceives this
seeing as to be done non-self-consciously. '75 In hindsight, after rereading the works
and critical theories of Maria Lugones and thinking back on that small, in-class
project, it holds true that recognition of who we are, including all our multiple
dimensional complex identities, is the first step in combating racism and
ethnocentrism. To create a new universe of meaning Lugones suggests that a new
Raza Mestiza must emerge.76 Instead of becoming this dual, fragmented, hyphenated
person, one must cross from one collectivity to the other and decide to stake
her/himself in the border between the two, where s/he can take a critical stance and
take stock of her/his plural personality."
As a practical matter, the decision by the drafters of the American
Convention, African Charter, CEDAW, and CERD to include both political and
social rights and to give them equal weight goes against the view held by
"developed" countries. This is particularly true of the United States' approach that
people's identities can be easily divisible, that political selves can be neatly separated
from cultural and social selves-a vision perceived by many, including Maria
Lugones, as a tool of domination and oppression. Thus, in order to resist and to
reject the dominant culture's imposition of the neatly split self-a political self
completely separate and distinct from the cultural self--"others" must declare
communities public space and break the conceptual tie between public space and
monoculturally comprehensions by Anglas/os. It requires that the imagination,
language, and conceptual framework as well as its structural underpinnings of the
public become hybrid.
The use of hybrid language can be deployed as a multi-layered
empowerment tool for "outsiders," especially Latinas in the estado unidense
dominant Angla/o society. If Latinas, who are second-class citizens in the majority
world because of our Latinidad and in our mundo Latino because of our
womanhood, 78 talk back,

if we

"habla[mos] p'atras,,79 we

exercise

self-

determination; we become visible by raising our voices both within and outside our
culture. The use of language also empodera a las Latinaswithin the majority culture
by making us autonomous, giving us agency, making our voices heard.
In juxtaposition, however, the inability to communicate in one's own
language is a tool of colonial power as it silences, destabilizes, subordinates, and
marginalizes. The Latina's view not only of her own personal world with its many
dimensions and layers, but also her view of the outside world, if presented in a
foreign tongue, will not be painted through her eyes, expressed in her own words, or

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 51. Author's translation: "Hey Girlfriend, if you don't look you won't see."
Id. at 65.
Lugones, On Borderlands, supra note 62. Authors' translation: hybrid race.
Id.
Hemdndez-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered,supranote 17.
See id.
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constructed through her palette.
One's other-lingualism becomes alienating,
depriving one of membership and full citizenship in English/Angla/o monolingual
society. Moreover, ostensibly similar roots in words can have dramatically different
meanings depending on language.
In studying whether competition and
competitiveness are useful and desirable from a feminist perspective or whether they
are harmful and to be avoided, Lugones makes a powerful observation: "[T]hough
the Latin competere means 'to come together,' the English compete means 'to strive
against.' 80 The dominant linguistic meaning of competition results in persons
working in opposition to others-a far cry from a coming together. The dominant
forces are to choose meaning and create frameworks; to own the right to define
persons and communities; to arrange a hierarchical order of things. Thus, language
and the lack of a hybrid language that can accommodate the multidimensionality of
Latinas becomes a major factor in deciding who belongs in and who can affect the
structural fabric of culture.
In addition to the use of hybrid language as a form of resistance and
rejection of the dominant Angla/o imposition of the neatly split self, the conceptual
framework of the public must also become hybrid. "Outsiders' and more
specifically Latinas', multidimensional and multilayered identities require a method,
afforded by this multidimensional discursive model, that expands and transforms
legal theoretical constructs into an inclusive whole. A multidimensional discursive
model is aware of, sensitive to, and inclusive of the multilayered factors constructing
Latinas' identities. Thus, this inclusive model urges that Latinas' voices be heard in
order to render Latinas' needs, wants, interests, and concerns a central part of the
analysis. The multidimensional strategy looks at the barriers created by the
conflation of identities rather than at isolated and separate aspects of identity to deny
the existence of barriers. In order to transform Latinas' status from olvidadas81 not
able to affect the world and cultural structure around them to active participants in
both the public and the private realms, given Latinas' diversity with respect to
citizenship, language, class, race, ethnicity/ancestry, sexuality and religion, any
studies of Latinas, regardless of the analytical focus-be it class, education, work or
economics- needs to consider their multilayered positions, locations, and spaces.
It is time to accept and admit that the "isolate-a-single-trait"
monolingualism of the popular/traditional Angla/o approach is fatally flawed in its
efficacy/validity for studying certain "outside" populations or groups, such as
Latinas. The problem of the estado unidense/Western construct-legal and social
alike-is that one must choose a single identity. However, "others" are part of more
than one collectivity.
This hybridity/multidimensionality trope mirrors the
indivisibility paradigm that recognizes the flow of segregation of rights and, by
analogy, atomization of identities.
It is paramount to develop, expand, and transform new and existing
methodologies if we are to engage the reality of peoples' lives -such as outsiders
and Latinas. Such a multidimensional discursive model embraces a critical Latinafeminist analysis, a broader perspective that will move las olvidadas from the

80. Lugones & Spelman, Competition, Compassion and Community, supra note 63, at 237.
81. Authors' translation: forgotten women. See generally Berta E. Hemindez-Truyol, Las
Olvidadas: Gendered in Justice/Gendered Injustice-Latinas, Fronteras, and the Law, I J. GENDER, RACE
& JUST. 353 (1998).
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margins of the superficial ornamental culture to the center of the legal and
philosophical discourse and, thus, to the center of the structural culture. Such a
move will effect autonomy, grant agency, embrace hybridity, promote equality, and
perform hyphenation.
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